Strategic Interactions between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt

Strategic Interactions between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt
We analyse optimal discretionary games between a benevolent central bank and a myopic government in a New Keynesian model. First, when lump-sum taxes are available and public debt is absent, we show that a Nash game results in too much government spending and excessively high interest rates, while fiscal leadership reinstates the cooperative... READ MORE...

Publication date: July 2008
ISBN 9781451870220
$18.00

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