The Mussa Theorem (and Other Results on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard)

The Mussa Theorem (and Other Results on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard)
Using a simple model of international lending, we show that as long as the IMF lends at an actuarially fair interest rate and debtor governments maximize the welfare of their taxpayers, any changes in policy effort, capital flows, or borrowing costs in response to IMF crisis lending are efficient. Thus, under these assumptions, the IMF cannot... READ MORE...

Publication date: October 2004
ISBN 9781451859799
$15.00

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